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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Schweiker v. Hansen: Equitable Estoppel Against the Government
The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a litigant who wrong-
fully induced another to change adversely his position from asserting a
right or a defense.' Traditionally, courts have refused to apply this doc-
trine against the government,2 holding that "erroneous, unauthorized,
or illegal acts or advice" of government agents are insufficient bases for
estoppel.3 Consequently, individuals with claims against the govern-
ment often have suffered wrongs that courts would not have tolerated if
the litigants were both private parties.4 Although some federal courts
have shown a willingness to depart from this rule against estoppel, 5 no
consistent theory of when the doctrine may be invoked against the gov-
ernment has emerged. The Supreme Court has indicated that "affirma-
I As defined in 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804 (5th ed. 1941), equitable
estoppel is
the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely pre-
cluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps
have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against
another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been
led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires
some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.
The six traditional elements of equitable estoppel are as follows:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a repre-
sentation or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to
the party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circum-
stances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3.
The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claim-
ing the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done, and
at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be done
with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon
by the other party. . . . 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other
party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act
upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse ...
Id. § 805 (emphasis omitted).
2 Although this discussion is limited to the federal government, the reluctance of courts
to estop the government and the rationale that supports governmental estoppel, apply
equally to state and local governments. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§§ 17.05-.06 (1958). See generaly Comment, Estoppel Against State, Count, and City, 23 WASH.
L. REV. 51 (1948).
3 Comment, Emergence of an Equitable Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Government-The Oil
Shale Cases, 46 U. COLO. L. REv. 433, 442-43 (1975). See notes 36-37 infia.
4 "When a private organization is involved, the only consideration in deciding an es-
toppel question is the relative equities between that organization and the party whom it has
misled." Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 959 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring) rev'dsub
nom. Schweiker v. Harris, 450 U.S. 785 (1980).
5 See notes 46-47 infra.
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tive misconduct" by a government agent may give rise to estoppel, 6 but
has failed to elaborate on this analysis.
In Schweiker v. Hansen ,7 the Supreme Court reversed per curiam the
Second Circuit's application of equitable estoppel against the govern-
ment.8 The Second Circuit had estopped the government from enforc-
ing a statutory requirement of a written application for social security
benefits. 9 The Second Circuit's application of equitable estoppel
marked a departure from traditional notions of affirmative misconduct,
and added a new twist to equitable estoppel by distinguishing actions
involving substantive requirements from those involving procedural re-
quirements. Although the Supreme Court correctly rejected the Second
Circuit's standards for equitable estoppel, its summary disposition of
Hansen was inappropriate in light of the confusion among lower courts
regarding the requirement of affirmative misconduct. The Court, by
factually distinguishing Hansen from other lower court decisions estop-
ping the government,' 0 once again avoided providing the lower courts
with a workable standard that accounts for the interests of all parties
affected by a particular application of equitable estoppel. This Note
examines these interests and proposes a two-tiered analysis for determin-




The government's immunity from equitable estoppel derives from
the concept of sovereign immunity.II Courts feared that applying equi-
table estoppel against the government would interfere with policymak-
6 See notes 25-34 and accompanying text infra.
7 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
8 See Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
9 Id. at 948-49.
10 450 U.S. at 788-89.
11 See, e.g., Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 495, 27 A.2d
569, 586 (1940) ("[T~he principle of sovereignty. . . would seem to defeat a claim of estop-
pel. . . ."). The idea that the sovereign cannot be estopped originated in England. The
justification was that " 'the King cannot be estopped, for it cannot be presumed the King
would do wrong to any person ... ' 16 HALSBURY'S LAWs OF ENGLAND 1695 n.8 (4th ed.
1976) (quoting 3 M. BACON, NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAw 442). One commentator dis-
puted this notion, and called it "a prerogative fallacy." Farrer, A Prerogative Fallaq--"That the
Crown is not Bound by Estoppel," 49 LAw Q. REV. 511, 511 (1933). Another has stated that
"[t]here is no trace of a decision holding that the King is not bound by equitable estoppel."
H. STREET, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY 157 (1953).
Early in the history of the United States, the government was liable neither for breaches
of contract nor for its agents' torts. Estoppel of the government because of agents' acts was
inconsistent with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. K. DAvIS,supra note 2, § 17.01; Berger,
Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 680, 683 (1959); Comment, Never Trust a
Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against the Government, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 393-95 (1969).
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ing and other necessary government functions.1 2 Although the doctrine
of sovereign immunity has eroded 13 and criticism of the government's
immunity from equitable estoppel has grown,14 courts have yet to de-
velop a consistent approach for determining when they should apply
estoppel against the government. 15
Courts first encroached upon the government's immunity from es-
toppel when the government was acting in its proprietary rather than
sovereign capacity. 16 In Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merill, 17 however,
the Supreme Court rejected this distinction, stating that the
"[g]overnment is not partly public or partly private, depending upon
a particular activity or the manner in which the Government con-
12 See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. United States, 112 F.2d 903, 906 (10th Cir. 1940)
(estoppel rejected where its application would thwart public policy); Elrod Slug Casting
Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Neb. 1944) (estoppel against Internal Reve-
nue officer would interfere with revenue assessment and collection).
13 In 1958, Professor Davis summarized this erosion:
A century ago, sovereign immunity was strong and clear. During the past
century, sovereign immunity has been largely crumbling, and today only rem-
nants remain. True, some of the remnants seem likely to endure for some
time to come. But the direction of movement is never in doubt. Among the
remnants of sovereign immunity is the notion, which still usually prevails,
that estoppel cannot run against the government.
K. DAvis, supra note 2, § 17.01. In 1976, Professor Davis commented that the question was
no longer whether estoppel could be applied against the government, but rather when it
should be applied. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 17.01 (1976).
The Supreme Court has recognized "a steadily growing policy of governmental liabil-
ity." Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 396 (1939). Federal statutes
also have diminished the effect of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act of
1946, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976). See also 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 397 (1972). For many
years, state courts have expressed their disfavor with sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Stone v.
Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 387, 381 P.2d 107, 109 (1963) (state can be liable in
tort actions); Muskopfv. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 92 (1961) (rejecting governmental immunity from tort liability); Evans v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97,482 P.2d 968 (1971) (defense of sovereign immunity judicially
abrogated).
14 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 11; Newman, Should Ofjiial Advice Be Reliable?-Poposals as
to Estoppeland Related.Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 374 (1953); Pillsbury,
Estoppel Against the Government, 13 Bus. LAw. 508 (1958); Note, Equitable Estoppel.of the Govern-
ment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1979); Note, The Proper Casefor Estoppe Against Federal Adminis-
trative Agencier, 28 NOTRE DAME LAw. 234 (1953); Comment, supra note 11; Comment, supra
note 3.
15 See notes 43-45 and accompanying text infra.
16 The Falcon, 19 F.2d 1009, 1014 (D. Md. 1927) (government may be estopped for
"acts done in its proprietary capacity"); Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F.
Supp. 915, 920 (D. Neb. 1944) ("[T]he defense of. . .estoppel may be made sparingly...
against the government in transactions involving its proprietary functions. . . "); see Cooke
v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) ("[A] government may suffer loss through the negli-
gence of its officers. If it comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain
of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there."). For an expla-
nation of how other restrictive rules invoked by courts have limited severely the impact of the
sovereign-proprietary distinction, see Comment, supra note 3, at 442-44.
17 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
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ducts it." '18 In Merrill, a farmer had relied upon a government agent's
statement that the farmer's crop was insurable, when in fact it was not. 19
After drought destroyed his crop,20 the farmer tried to recover from the
government. Notwithstanding the agent's erroneous advice, the Court
denied relief. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, held that
anyone dealing with the government "takes the risk of having accurately
ascertained that [the government agent has stayed] within the bounds of
his authority" 2 1 as that authority is defined by statutes and regulations.
The Court found that the relevant regulations, published in the Federal
Register,2 2 had the force of law23 and thus precluded the farmer from
recovering. 24
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly estopped the gov-
ernment,2 5 it has left open the possibility that official misconduct may
18 Id. at 383-84. Apparently ignoring the language in Merill, courts have continued to
distinguish between the government acting in a sovereign and a proprietary capacity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Florida, 482 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1973) (federal government conveyance of
land is a governmental not proprietary act); Air-Sea Brokers, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d
1008, 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (government acting in sovereign capacity when collecting or re-
funding duties on imports).
In United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970), the court applied
the estoppel doctrine in a government suit to enforce a contract. The Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that the distinction between sovereign and proprietary functions is not clear-cut:
While it is said that the Government can be estopped in its proprietary
role, but not in its sovereign role, the authorities are not clear about just what
activities are encompassed by each. In its proprietary role, the Government is
acting as a private concern would; in its sovereign role, the Government is
carrying out its unique governmental functions for the benefit of the whole
public.
Id. at 101.
19 A representative of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation had assured the farmer
that he could insure his reseeded winter wheat under the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (1976) (original version at ch. 30, § 501, 52 Stat. 72 (1938)). The Corpo-
ration's regulations, however, had provided no protection for spring wheat planted on re-
seeded winter wheat acreage. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 381
(1947).
20 332 U.S. at 382.
21 Id. at 384. Although the Menill Court never mentioned equitable estoppel, several
cases have cited Merrill as supporting a restrictive application of estoppel against the govern-
ment. See, e.g., Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1973).
22 10 Fed. Reg. 1586, 1591 (1945).
23 332 U.S. at 384-85.
24 Id. at 386. The dissent argued that "it is an absurdity to hold that every farmer who
insures his crops knows what the Federal Register contains or even knows that there is such a
publication." Id. at 387 (Jackson, J. dissenting). For a criticism of Memd1 and the cases upon
which it relied, see Note, Governmental Immunities - A Stud in Misplaced Solicitude, 16 U. CiI. L.
REv. 128 (1948).
25 Some commentators and courts, however, have read Moser v. United States, 341 U.S.
41 (1951), as a case in which the Supreme Court estopped the government. See, e.g., United
States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988-89 (9th Cir. 1973); K. DAVIs, supra note 2,
§ 17.02. In Moser, the petitioner had claimed exemption from military service as a neutral
alien. Although a federal statute barred him from citizenship, the Court held that the peti-
tioner could be naturalized because of "the misleading circumstances" that had led him to
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justify its application. The petitioner in Montana v. Kenned 26 was born in
Italy because a United States official had denied his pregnant mother a
passport to reenter the United States. 27 The petitioner argued that be-
cause of the official's misconduct, the government was estopped from
asserting the petitioner's foreign birth in order to deny him citizenship. 28
The Court disagreed. Without elaboration, it held that the official's ac-
tion fell "far short of misconduct" that could trigger estoppel.29
In INS v. Hibi, 3 0 the Supreme Court again suggested that affirma-
tive misconduct by a government official might justify estoppel against
the government. In Hibi, a Filipino alien requested naturalization
under the Nationality Act of 194031 more than seventeen years after the
time limit for such requests had expired.3 2 He contended that the gov-
ernment was estopped from enforcing the Act's time limit because it had
neither advised him of his rights nor stationed a naturalization official in
the Philippines during the period of his eligibility.3 3 The Court found
no "affirmative misconduct" by the government, but failed to articulate
the type of misconduct necessary to justify estoppelA4
Several federal courts of appeals have interpreted Montana and Hibi
to require a finding of affirmative misconduct on the part of government
officials as a precondition to applying equitable estoppel against the
government.3 5 Although they have yet to set the parameters of affirma-
believe that the military exemption would not affect his eligibility for citizenship. 341 U.S. at
47. The Court, holding that the petitioner did not knowingly waive his rights to citizenship,
found "no need to evaluate these circumstances on the basis of any estoppel of the Govern-
ment." Id.
26 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
27 Id. at 314. Petitioner's American-born mother, whose husband was an Italian citizen,
was residing in Italy during her pregnancy. She testified that an American consular officer's
refusal to issue her a passport because of her pregnancy prevented her return to the United
States. The Court noted that "the United States did not require a passport for a citizen to
return to the country" at the time of her request. Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 314-15. Petitioner's mother further testifed that the official said, " 'I am sorry,
Mrs., you cannot [return to the United States] in that condition.' "Id. at 314. In stating that
the official's remarks to petitioner's mother might have been "well-meant advice," id., the
Court implied that the comment referred to health concerns rather than legal obligations,
and concluded the official did not expect her to rely on his statement.
30 414 U.S. 5 (1973).
31 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952). The Act allowed
aliens who served in the United States military during World War II to become naturalized
citizens.
32 414 U.S. at 7.
33 Id. at 7-8.
34 Id. at 8-9. The three dissenting Justices argued that the failure by United States
officials to publicize the rights of eligible aliens under the Act, and their deliberate failure to
post a naturalization officer in the Philippines constituted misconduct sufficient to invoke the
estoppel doctrine. Id. at 9-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35 See, e.g., Oki v. INS, 598 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1979) (failure of government offi-
cials to inform alien of requirement not affirmative misconduct); Leimbach v. Califano, 596
F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1979) (Social Security Administration agent's misinforming applicant
1982]
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tive misconduct, courts generally have held that mistakes of law, 36 erro-
neous advice, and misrepresentations by government agents do not
constitute misconduct sufficient to estop the government.37 This posi-
tion parallels the notion that the unauthorized acts of its agents do not
bind the government. 38 Federal agents may act only within the limits
Congress has prescribed in its delegation of authority. Any action be-
not affirmative misconduct); Simon v. Califano, 593 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1979) (negligence
of agent in incorrectly filling out applicant's application not affirmative misconduct); United
States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1978) (government could not be estopped from
asserting title to land absent showing of affirmative misconduct), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917
(1979); Sun I1 Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1976) (INS's delay in determining
alien's correct status constituted affirmative misconduct); Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d
301, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1976) (agent's violation of regulation was affirmative misconduct); Santi-
ago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (admission of excludable alien did not
constitute affirmative misconduct), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
36 See, e.g., Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957) (equitable es-
toppel does not prevent Commissioner from correcting mistake of law); Schafer v. Helvering,
83 F.2d 317, 320 (D.C. Cir.) ("Whoever deals with the government does so with notice that no
agent can, by neglect or acquiescence, commit it to an erroneous interpretation of the law."),
aft'd, 299 U.S. 171 (1936). But see Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317-18 (9th Cir.
1962) (Commissioner estopped from asserting tax liability of trustee that distributed assets of
trust funds in reliance on Commissioner's determination that trust property was not taxable).
37 See Cheers v. HEW, 610 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980)
(incorrect information causing claimant to delay filing for Social Security Administration
benefits did not estop government); Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1979)
(agent's erroneous statement did not estop government from enforcing written application
requirement); Goldberg v. Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1976) (government could not be
estopped from denying Social Security Administration benefits to plaintiff who became ineli-
gible because of reliance on agent's representations), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); Parker v.
Finch, 327 F. Supp. 193, 195 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (agent's misinformation will not estop govern-
ment from enforcing written application requirement); Flamm v. Ribicoff, 203 F. Supp. 507,
510 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (same); Brant v. United States, 597 F.2d 716, 720-21 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(agent's misrepresentation that retired military officers were eligible for housing allowance
does not bind government). See general'y Note, supra note 14, at 23 7-44.
38 Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) ("[A]nyone entering into
an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he
who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority."); United
States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 32 (1940); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U.S. 389, 409 (1917) ("[T]he United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers
or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the
law does not sanction or permit."). See general'y Saltman, Estoppel Against the Government: Have
Recent Decisions Rounded the Corners of the Agent's Authority Problem in Federal Procurements,, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1976).
The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the unauthorized act rule. In Brandt v. Hickel,
427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970), appellants had submitted a noncompetitive oil and gas lease offer
to a regional Land Management Office. The Land Office rejected the offer because of an
error in form, but allowed appellants 30 days to resubmit the offer. Relying on this promise,
appellants chose to submit a revised offer instead of appealing the rejection. Subsequently,
the Secretary of the Interior ruled that the Land Office's promise had been unauthorized and
that the appellants' failure to appeal deprived them of any right to assert the validity of the
original offer. Id. at 55. The court held that the Secretary was estopped from disclaiming the
Land Office's promise even though the promise was "unauthorized by statute, regulation, or
decision." Id. at 56. The court, however, based the estoppel on due process grounds, finding
that the appellants were denied the right to appeal. Id. at 57.
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yond such limits contravenes the principle of separation of powers.39
Thus, if the government is estopped from enforcing a valid statute once
a government agent acts outside the scope of his authority, then the
agency represents, in effect, a legislative force. 40 Another related argu-
ment involves the preservation of the government's revenue functions;4'
particularly in tax cases, an estoppel against the government could seri-
ously threaten the public treasury. 42
The prevailing approach to equitable estoppel of the government
fails to weigh adequately the interests of each party in a dispute. Al-
though some courts have recognized governmental interests as legiti-
mate, such as protection of the public treasury and enforcement of
statutory requirements, they usually overlook the predicament of the in-
dividual who has relied on the government's error.43 In addition, the
39 See Berger, supra note 11, at 686. For a discussion of the constitutional considerations
in the use of estoppel, see Note, Equitable Estoppel ofthe Government, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 551,
565-67 (1979).
40 Professor Berger observes:
Administrators are clothed with authority to act and make rules by the exer-
cise of legislative power; and such legislative power is exercisable only by Con-
gress. It cannot be exercised by an administrator; no administrator may do
that which is forbidden, nor exercise a power that was withheld. The fact
that a citizen was injured by his action does not clothe an administrator with
legislative power, i.e., with the power to assume an authority that has been
withheld or prohibited.
Berger, supra note 11, at 686.
41 See Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Neb. 1944)
(estoppel against internal revenue officer would interfere with revenue assessment and collec-
tion); Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1151 (1928) (estoppel in tax cases should
only be applied in "the most extraordinary case"). See also Automobile Club v. Commis-
sioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957) ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the
correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of law."). Some courts have been willing to
apply estoppel against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). See, e.g., Miller v. United States,
500 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1974) (IRS estopped from raising statute of limitations); Walsonavich
v. United States, 335 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1964) (government estopped from raising statute of
limitations because of Commissioner's agreement with taxpayer); Schuster v. Commissioner,
312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962) (Commissioner estopped from asserting liability of bank for
unpaid estate taxes). For a discussion of why the IRS should be subject to estoppel, see Com-
ment, supra note 11, at 398-99. See generally Manning, The Application of the Doctrine of Estoppel
Against the Government in Federal Tar Cases, 30 N.C.L. REv. 356 (1952); Note, The Emerging
Concept of Tax Estoppel, 40 VA. L. REv. 313 (1954).
42 In Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947), for example, the
Supreme Court declared that it is "the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by
Congress for charging the public treasury."
In one instance, the Supreme Court suggested that the availability of estoppel might
engender acts of collusion between government officials and private parties. Lee v. Munroe,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813). Collusion by federal officers, however, has been rare. Berger,
supra note 11, at 684.
43 See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (regulations binding
"regardless of actual knowledge. . . or of the hardship resulting from innocent ignorance");
Cheers v. Secretary of HEW, 610 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898
(1980); Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d 300, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Weinberger,
546 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); Flamm v. Ribicoff, 203 F.
Supp. 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:609
current approach focuses on concerns unrelated to the governmental in-
terests that courts seek to protect. The "unauthorized act" justification
allows a court to dispose of a claim of estoppel without examining the
actual threat to the public treasury or the statutory scheme.4 4 Similarly,
the requirement of affirmative misconduct fails to focus on the nature of
the harm resulting from the misconduct.
45
Although some courts have provided relief to private parties in
cases of extreme injustice,46 they have failed to improve upon the pre-
dominant modes of analysis.4 7 In Comiel-Rodriguez v. IN. 48 for example,
the Second Circuit carved an exception to the rule that misinformation
44 See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
45 See notes 25-34 and accompanying text supra. At least one court has implied that an
agent's act does not constitute affirmative misconduct if the act is unauthorized. Leimbach v.
Califano, 596 F.2d 300, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1979).
46 Eg., Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976) (government estopped
from asserting alien's noncompliance with immigration requirement); United States v. Whar-
ton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) (government estopped from asserting untimeliness of appli-
cation for deed); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970) (Secretary of the Interior
estopped from disavowing Land Manager's statement); United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co.,
421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970) (government estopped from enforcing contract with lumber com-
pany); Gestuvo v. District Director of INS, 337 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (INS estopped
from denying alien's preference classification); Emeco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d
652 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (government estopped from denying existence of supply contract).
47 The Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that Supreme Court precedent does not provide
a clear standard for proper application of estoppel against the government, has found in that
precedent an implicit rejection of "the contention that under no circumstances may estoppel
lie against the government." United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). Consequently, the Ninth Circuit has exhibited a willingness
to depart from traditional restrictions in estoppel cases. E.g., United States v. Lazy FC
Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973) (government may be estopped even in its sovereign
capacity); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970) (government estopped from disavow-
ing agent's unauthorized representation). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973), the Ninth Circuit applied a two-part analysis to determine the appro-
priateness of estopping the government. First, the court required that four elements of estop-
pel be present:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts;
(2) He must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that
the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended;
(3) The latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and
(4) He must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979);
see note 107 in/fa. In addition, the court applied a balancing test, weighing the potential for
"the government's wrongful conduct ... to work a serious injustice" against any damage to
the public's interest that the application of estoppel might cause. United States v. Lazy FC
Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Comment, Estop pel and Government, 14
GONZ. L. REv. 597, 603-07 (1979); Comment, supra note 3, at 446-51. Since the Hibi decision,
the Ninth Circuit has also required a showing of affirmative misconduct. Eg., United States
v. Ruby, 588 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); Santiago v.
INS, 526 F.2d 488, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). The
court, however, has failed to develop consistent standards for either the affirmative miscon-
duct requirement or the balancing test. See note 86 infra. See generaly 1976 UTAH L. REV.
371, 380-85.
48 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
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does not constitute affirmative misconduct. In Comiel, the government
sought to deport an alien who had become ineligible for "special immi-
grant" status by marrying three days before her admission to the United
States.4 9 The consular officer had failed to warn her of a statutory re-
quirement that she be unmarried, contrary to a federal regulation that
required such advance warning. The Second Circuit emphasized the
official's noncompliance with the regulation,5 0 and held that his failure
to warn constituted affirmative misconduct.5 1 Nevertheless, the court





In 1974, a Social Security field representative interviewed Ann
Hansen, a divorced mother, to determine her eligibility for mother's in-
surance benefits.5 3 Based on the information that Mrs. Hansen pro-
vided, the representative informed her that she was ineligible for the
benefits.5 4 Consequently, Mrs. Hansen did not file a written application
for the benefits as required by statute.55 One year later, Mrs. Hansen
49 Id. at 302-03. The Immigration and Nationality Act requires that a minor alien ap-
plying for "special immigrant" status be "an unmarried person under twenty-one years of
age." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1976).
50 532 F.2d at 306-07. The regulation provides: "The consular officer shall warn an
alien, when appropriate, that he will be inadmissible as such an immigrant if he is not unmar-
ried at the time of application for admission . . . ." 22 C.F.R. § 42.122(d) (1981).
The court's emphasis on the officer's noncompliance with the regulation distinguishes
Corniel from the Menill line of cases, which maintain that misinformation or erroneous advice
will not give rise to estoppel. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. Unlike the Mernm7 line
of cases, the Carnmi court found that the agent's failure to comply with the regulation consti-
tuted affirmative misconduct. The court's holding necessarily rejects the unauthorized act
rule, because the official clearly was unauthorized to disobey the regulation.
51 532 F.2d at 306-07.
52 Id. at 307 n.18. The court noted that it did not intend that "noncompliance with any
regulation, no matter how minor its impact or importance" would estop the government. Id.
One factor that the court considered was the availability of a simple and inexpensive way to
inform aliens of the nonmarriage requirement. Id. at 307 nn.17-18.
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1) (1976).
54 Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 946 (2d Cir.), rev'dsub nom., Schweiker v. Harris, 450
U.S. 785 (1980). The only record of the meeting was the representative's daily log, which
included Mrs. Hansen's name, the last name of her sons, and the notation "P/AD," an abbre-
viation for "post-adjudication action." This notation indicated that the representative
thought that Mrs. Hansen's claim had already been determined adversely. Id. at 944. The
only evidence of the content of Mrs. Hansen's interview was her own testimony before an
administrative law judge. Id. at 944-45.
55 Id. at 946. 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 2 (g)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
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discovered that she had been eligible and filed a written application.5 6
The Social Security Administration (SSA), in accordance with the stat-
ute, granted her benefits retroactive one year from the date of written
application.5 7 Mrs. Hansen then filed a claim against the government
to recover the additional benefits for the year preceding her initial inter-
view with the representative.
Affirming the district court's award on other grounds,58 a divided
Second Circuit held that the government was estopped from requiring
the application to be in writing. The court determined that the SSA
representative's misinformation and his failure to encourage Mrs. Han-
sen to file a written application amounted to governmental "miscon-
duct."59 The majority noted that courts often distinguish between a
"mere failure to provide accurate information" and affirmative miscon-
duct in deciding whether to estop the government.6 0 The Second Cir-
cuit found no affirmative misconduct in terms of an "intentional
violation of a rule having the force of law."6 1 Nonetheless, it concluded
that where "misinformation provided by a Government official com-
The widow and every surviving divorced mother. . . of an individual
who died a fully or currently insured individual, if such widow or surviving
divorced mother-
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits ...
shall . . .be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit for each month,
beginning with the first month . ..in which she becomes so entitled ...
20 C.F.R. § 404.601 (1979) provides:
(a) Claimant defned. The term "claimant" for purposes of this subpart
refers to the individual who has filed on his own behalf, .. an application
for monthly benefits ...
(d) Filing of Application on prescibedform. Except as provided ...an
individual has not "filed an application" for purposes. . . of the Act until an
application on a form prescribed in § 404.602 has been filed ....
Cf. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.602, 404.603, 404.610 (1981) (restructured version).
56 619 F.2d at 944-45.
57 Id. at 945. 42 U.S.C. § 4020)(1) (1976) provides:
An individual who would have been entitled to a benefit under. . . this
section for any month after August 1950 had he filed application therefor
prior to the end of such month shall be entitled to such benefit for such month
if he files application therefor prior to the end of the twelfth month immedi-
ately succeeding such month.
Relying on the regulation and the statutory requirements, the administrative law judge de-
nied Mrs. Hansen's claim for benefits retroactive to the time of her oral inquiry. The Appeals
Council upheld this decision. 619 F.2d at 946.
58 The district court awarded the retroactive benefits to Mrs. Hansen on the ground that
the regulation requiring a written application was "unreasonably restrictive." 619 F.2d at
946.
59 619 F.2d at 948-49. The court found that the agent's conduct "falls short of inten-
tional deception but does constitute affirmative misinformation." Id. at 947.
60 Id. at 948.
61 Id. The court probably was referring to Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1976). See notes 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
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bined with a showing of misconduct" 62 accompanies a "source of objec-
tive standards" 63 to guide such conduct, the government may be
estopped from enforcing a procedural statutory provision.
The representative's only affirmative act was his statement to Mrs.
Hansen that she was ineligible for benefits. 64 Although the evidence did
not indicate clearly whether the representative was responsible for this
error,65 the court supported its finding of misconduct by relying on a
provision of the Social Security Claims Manual that directs a represen-
tative not to deter an individual from filing because he is ineligible for
benefits. 66 The court conceded that the provision lacked the force of law,
but distinguished procedural and substantive statutory requirements:
[H]ere we are talking about a procedural requirement: the necessity
of filing a written as opposed to an oral application. [Mrs. Hansen]
was at all times "substantively" eligible in the sense that she was in
the class of people that Congress intended to benefit. . . . [T]here is
a distinction between substantive ineligibility, on the one hand, and
62 619 F.2d at 948.
63 Id. at 949.
64 See id. at 946-47.
65 The government argued that Mrs. Hansen failed to meet the prerequisite for eligibil-
ity in not telling the agent that her former husband was deceased. Id. at 947. The Appeals
Council, which upheld the Administrative Law Judge's decision, concluded that the misinfor-
mation was Mrs. Hansen's fault. The Second Circuit did not resolve the issue, but speculated
that the agent might not have been familiar with the applicable provision because it was
relatively new. The court therefore based its finding of misconduct primarily on the agent's
deterring Mrs. Hansen from filing. Id
66 Id. The dissent added:
It is worth noting how small Connelly's violation of the relevant passage of
the Claims Manual actually was. This reads:
2003. Administrative Policy of Acceptance of Application.
a) General
Where an individual is inquiring about possible current entitlement to .. .
benefits, his interests will ordinarily be best served by filing an application
immediately so that retroactive . . . benefits will be better protected and a
determination made on his entitlement. . . . The individual must make the
actual decision of whether or not to file, but he should be fully informed of the
application requirements and the advantages of filing. Unless filing is obvi-
ously disadvantageous or the question is one of filing for reduced. . . benefits
only, it will be appropriate to suggest to the individual that he file an applica-
tion. Resolve any doubtful situation in favor of suggesting that the individual
file since he may withdraw his application later if he wishes.
.... Do not deter an individual from filing solely on the basis that he is not
eligible. . . .This is true even where he is clearly ineligible. Every inquirer
should receive an explanation of the application requirements and an appli-
cation should be taken if he indicates that he wishes to file. If an individual
makes no mention that he wishes to file but is not satisfied with the informa-
tion about his eligibility, it should be suggested that he file an application so
that a determination may be made.
619 F.2d at 957 n.10 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
Judge Newman concurred in the court's opinion, but disagreed with Judge Oakes' reli-
ance on the claims manual, because he found that the representative's noncompliance with
the provision was not "a dispositive factor." Id. at 961 n.6.
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the fulfillment of a procedural requirement by a person who is sub-
stantively eligible on the other. In our view, at least in the latter case,
misinformation provided by a Government official combined with a
showing of misconduct (even if it does not rise to the level of a viola-
tion of a legally binding rule) should be sufficient to require
estoppel.
6 7
Without pursuing further the reason for the procedural/substantive
distinction, the majority concluded that the representative's statements
and conduct justified the application of estoppel against the govern-
ment. The court stressed, however, that its holding would only apply to
circumstances in which a procedural rather than a substantive require-
ment was involved, and where a government employee had contravened
some objective source of authority.6 8
The Supreme Court reversed per curiam,69 dismissing Hansen as
"another in [a] line of cases" in which the misconduct was inadequate to
estop the government from enforcing a valid regulation. 70 The Court
distinguished Hansen from cases in which the federal courts had es-
topped the government on the basis that those cases either involved a
writing or posed no threat to the public fisc.7t Because the Court found
67 619 F.2d at 948.
The Second Circuit's standard of what misconduct sufficed to warrant estoppel implic-
itly rejects the theory that the government cannot be estopped because of an unauthorized act
of its agent. See notes 38-40 *and accompanying text supra. This rejection is desirable; other-
wise the unauthorized act justification could preclude any application of equitable estoppel
against the government because it would not authorize an agent to misrepresent facts or give
erroneous advice. See Comment, supra note 3, at 443. But see Miller v. United States, 500
F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (2d Cir. 1974)(in taxpayer's refund action, Commissioner's issuance of
disallowance notice was erroneous but not "unauthorized"). See also Berger, supra note 11, at
686-88; Saltman, supra note 38.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is historically based upon 'justice and conscience." J.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 801 (5th ed. 1941). The unauthorized act justification
not only contravenes the underlying purpose of equitable estoppel, but also promotes govern-
ment mismanagement and incompetence. For a discussion of several social and economic
advantages of allowing estoppel of the government, see Comment, supra note 11, at 402-06.
68 619 F.2d at 949.
69 Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam). Justices Marshall and Bren-
nan dissented.
70 Id. at 788-89. The Court cited lower court refusals to estop the government when a
government agent had misinformed a party of the nature of social security requirements. See
note 35 supra.
71 450 U.S. at 788-89 & n.4. The Court emphasized "'the duty of all courts to observe
the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury."' Id. at 788 (quoting
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947)). In approving the lower
courts' reliance on Memll for refusing to estop the government, see notes 17-24 and accompa-
nying text supra, the Supreme Court suggested that these courts recognized the duty of pro-
tecting the public treasury. 450 U.S. at 788.
These courts, however, did not discuss this duty; instead, they cited MAeill for the pro-
positions that regulations are binding regardless of actual knowledge or of the hardship result-
ing from innocent ignorance (see, e.g., Cheers v. Secretary of HEW, 610 F.2d 463, 469 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980)), and that the government is not bound by the
unauthorized acts of its agents. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477, 480-81 (2d
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these cases "easily distinguishable" from Hansen, it declined to consider
their correctness. 72
The Court rejected the Second Circuit's approach to estoppel
against the government on three grounds. First, it did not believe that
the SSA agent's error was serious because the agent's conduct "did not
cause [Mrs. Hansen] to take action. . . or fail to take action. . . that
[she] could not correct any time."' 73 Second, the Court agreed with dis-
senting Judge Friendly that a breach of the claims manual is insufficient
to estop the agency from asserting the written application require-
ment.74 Finally, the Court found the Second Circuit's distinction be-
tween substantive eligibility and procedural requirements an
inadequate basis for estoppel in this case because Congress expressly
provided that only one who "has filed application" for benefits may re-
ceive them.75
III -
THE NEED FOR A CLEAR STANDARD FOR GOVERNMENT
ESTOPPEL
A. The Supreme Court's Failure to Clari5 the Affirmative Misconduct
Requirement
The issue presented in Hansen deserved more than the cursory treat-
ment that the Supreme Court gave it. The dissent correctly pointed out
that a "summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this
Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are
not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error. ' 76 Contrary to
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977). In another social security case that the Court did
not mention, the Seventh Circuit did cite Merill in support of the court's duty to protect the
public treasury. Gressley v. Califano, 609 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1979). In Gressly, an
SSA agent allegedly told the plaintiff who had been correctly denied disability benefits sev-
eral years earlier that he would be eligible for benefits if he filed amended tax returns for
those years. After filing these returns, the plaintiff learned that according to statute, he had
filed too late to establish his eligibility. Id. at 1266. Gresslq, is distinguishable from Cheers and
Goldberg because the agent's misrepresentation did not cause the plaintiff to lose benefits that
he otherwise would have received. Arguably, the plaintiff did not rely to his detriment on the
alleged misrepresentation, a necessary condition for equitable estoppel. See note I supra.
72 609 F.2d at 1266.
73 Id.
74 If [the agent's] minor breach of such a manual suffices to estop [the govern-
ment], then the Government is put "at risk that every alleged failure by an
agent to follow instructions to the last detail in one of a thousand cases will
deprive it of the benefit of the written application requirement which experi-
ence has taught to be essential to the honest and effective administratior of
the Social Security laws."
450 U.S. at 789-90 (quoting Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 956 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting)).
75 450 U.S. at 790.
76 Id. at 791 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the majority's assumptions, neither the facts in Hansen, nor the law re-
garding equitable estoppel of the government, is clear.
In Hansen, a factual dispute centered upon whether Mrs. Hansen
had informed the agent that her former husband was deceased, a crucial
prerequisite to eligibility.77 Because the Second Circuit relied on the
agent's breach of the claims manual rule to find misconduct, 78 it never
resolved this issue.79 The doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that
the party accused of a misrepresentation know all the relevant facts;80
the Supreme Court, therefore, should have considered the agent's
knowledge of the relevant facts to determine whether to apply estoppel.
The Court ignored this factual issue; because Mrs. Hansen could have
filed the application on her own at any time, the Court believed that the
agent's conduct did not cause Mrs. Hansen to act to her detriment.8 1
This analysis of the effect of the agent's misinformation on Mrs. Hansen
"blinks in the face of the obvious."'8 2 The vast majority of social security
applicants are ignorant of the complex laws governing the Social Secur-
ity system, and rely on the SSA agent's advice and information.8 3
The majority was equally remiss in failing to articulate what type
of misconduct triggers an estoppel against the government.8 4 Federal
courts have been wary of estopping the government, 85 and have not ap-
plied a consistent analysis when they do.86 As a result, private parties
77 Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d at 947; see note 65 supra.
78 619 F.2d at 947-49.
79 It may well be, as the Government argues and the Appeals Council found,
that this misinformation resulted from [Mrs. Hansen's] failure to tell [the
agent] that her former husband was dead, since this fact was a prerequisite of
her eligibility. It could also be that, as the amendment affording benefits to
[Mrs. Hansen] was relatively new, [the agent] was unfamiliar with it.
Id. at 947; see note 65 supra.
80 See note 1 supra.
81 It may be that [the agent] erred because he was unfamiliar with a recent
amendment which afforded benefits to [Mrs. Hansen] . . . . Or it may be
that [Mrs. Hansen] gave [the agent] too little information for him to know
that he was in error. . . . But at worst, [his] conduct did not cause [Mrs.
Hansen] to take action, ... or fail to take action, . . . that [she] could not
correct at any time.
450 U.S. at 789.
82 Id. at 794 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 794-95.
84 The Court conceded that "[i]t has never decided what type of conduct by a Govern-
ment employee will estop the Government from insisting upon compliance with valid regula-
tions governing the distribution of welfare benefits." Id. at 788.
85 See cases cited in notes 33 & 36 supra.
86 For example, the Ninth Circuit's approach to estoppel against the government relies
more on a case-by-case factual inquiry than a consistent application of the affirmative mis-
conduct requirement. Two immigration cases illustrate this point. In Santiago v. INS, 526
F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976), the plaintiffs were aliens
who had entered the country on a derivative preference visa that required them to be accom-
panied by a spouse or parent. Id. at 489. Despite knowledge of this requirement, immigration
officials improperly admitted each plaintiff who preceded his spouse or parent. Id. at 490.
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have suffered injustices and have not received evenhanded treatment by
courts in estoppel cases involving the government.
The majority attempted to distinguish Hansen from other cases in
which the government was estopped by distinguishing monetary from
nonmonetary relief, and oral from written statements. 87 These distinc-
tions, however, fail to provide a sound analytical basis for explaining
why estoppel may be invoked against the government in some situations
but not others, and heighten the confusion in this area of the law.88 The
Court neglected to explain why or how a request for monetary damages,
as opposed to a request for nonmonetary relief, affects a determination
of whether there was sufficient misconduct to justify estopping the gov-
ernment.89 Furthermore, the governmental interest in protecting the
public treasury from fraudulent claims does not justify a court's refusal
to apply estoppel when a plaintiff seeks benefits that he would have re-
ceived had the government agent not erred.
Similarly, the Court offered no explanation why a written but not
an oral misrepresentation can support a claim of estoppe. 90 Most likely,
the Court shared Judge Friendly's concern that those who do not qual-
ify for benefits would obtain them by making fraudulent or frivolous
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the government should be estopped from
asserting their excludability at entry as a basis for deportation. The court held that the fail-
ure to inform or inquire on the part of the immigration officials was insufficient to justify
estoppel. Id. at 491-93 (Powell, J., concurring). In Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
1976), the alien plaintiff had applied for labor certification based on his employment, but was
denied it 10 months later because of misinformation that his employer gave the INS. Id. at
1327. The plaintiff, however, had sent a statement from his employer to the INS correcting
the error in the plaintiff's employment status nine months before the INS decision, but for
unknown reasons the INS did not receive the letter for three months. Id. at 1329 (Wright, J.,
dissenting). The INS reconsidered the application, but denied it because the plaintiff's com-
pany no longer existed. Id. at 1327. The plaintiff then filed an application for permanent
residence status, but INS denied this application because the plaintiff never received labor
certification. Id. The court characterized the INS' 10-month delay as "affirmative inaction,"
and estopped the government from denying him the benefit of labor certification in consider-
ing his application. Id. at 1329. Arguably, Sun II Yoo does not present any stronger a case for
estoppel than Santiago, for in Sun I Yoo the INS received conflicting evidence on the plaintiff's
employment status and a change in the law was at least partly responsible for the plaintiff's
misfortune. See 534 F.2d at 1330 (Wright, J., dissenting). Although the Ninth Circuit at-
tempted to distinguish Santiago, see id. at 1328, it failed to provide a methodology for defining
conduct that would satisfy the affirmative misconduct requirement.
87 450 U.S. 785, 788-89 & n.4 (1981).
88 The majority . . . suggest[s] that estoppel may be justified in some circum-
stances. Yet rather than address the issue in a comprehensive fashion, the
Court simply concludes that this is not such a case. The apparent message of
today's decision-that we will know an estoppel when we see one-provides
inadequate guidance to the lower courts in an area of the law that, contrary
to the majority's view, is far from settled.
Id. at 791-92 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
89 Id. at 788-89 & n.4; see id. at 794 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 788-89 & n.4.
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allegations of official misconduct. 9 1 This concern, however, is relevant
only to the burden of proving the agent's misconduct, 92 not to the issue
of whether the misconduct justified estopping the government.
The Court's oral/written and monetary/nonmonetary distinctions
find no support in prior case law. Few, if any, federal courts have made
the existence of a written misrepresentation or agreement a prerequisite
for applying estoppel against the government. 93 Federal courts also
have invoked estoppel where the public treasury was affected. 94 More-
over, some of the cases that the Court cited as so clearly distinguishable
from Hansen arguably are not.95
91 [T]he majority opens the door of the federal fisc not simply to Mrs. Hansen,
whom we at least know to have visited the HEW office and said something,
but to thousands who merely will make a detailed claim that they have done
so and whom there is no effective means of rebutting. Millions of dollars will
have to be expended simply to ascertain whether conditions of eligibility
claimed in a subsequent written application existed at the time of the alleged
oral one.
Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 949 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
92 Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 793 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93 The Supreme Court had never before stated that the lack of a writing had a bearing
on its decision, even in prior decisions involving oral misrepresentations. See Montana v.
Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). See
also notes 17-29 and accompanying text supra.
The Court also overlooked the fact that federal courts have applied estoppel where there
was no misrepresentation, written or oral. Eg., Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir.
1980) (because it took four years to respond to alien's petition for preference classification,
INS estopped from claiming that alien failed to pursue his claim for preference classification);
Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) (INS' nine-month delay in acting properly
upon alien's petition for labor certification estopped INS from denying alien's labor certifica-
tion in subsequent petition for permanent resident status); Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976) (immigration official's failure to inform alien of marital status re-
quirement estopped INS from asserting alien's noncompliance with requirement in deporta-
tion proceedings).
94 E.g., Miller v. United States, 500 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1974)(IRS estopped from raising
statute of limitations in taxpayer's refund action); Walsonavich v. United States, 335 F.2d 96,
101 (3d Cir. 1964)(government estopped from raising statute of limitations because of Com-
missioner's agreement with taxpayer); Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.
1962) (Commissioner estopped from asserting liability of bank for unpaid estate taxes).
Private parties have also recovered from the government in contract cases. E.g., Emeco
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 652 (Ct. Cl. 1973)(government estopped from denying
existence of supply contract).
95 The Court cited Semaan v. Mumford, 335 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1964), as an example
of a case that did not threaten the public treasury. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 788-89
n.4. In Semaan, a government employee alleged that he was discharged illegally from his
position because he was treated as a probationary instead of a permanent employee. 335 F.2d
at 704-05. The court held that the government may be estopped from denying the plaintiff's
permanent employee status because of certain actions of his superiors. Id. at 705-06. The
dissent in Schweiker correctly noted that estoppel in Senaan would affect the public fisc if the
plaintiff ultimately won reinstatement. 450 U.S. at 792 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The Court also cited United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1966),
as a case distinguishable from Hansen. 450 U.S. at 788-89 n.4. In Fox Lake Stale Ban, the
court estopped the government from bringing an action against a bank under the Civil False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §231 (1964), because the bank, which had improperly filed certain
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The majority's failure to expand on the significance of the
oral/written and monetary/nonmonetary distinctions will force lower
courts to speculate on what weight, if any, they should be given in estop-
pel cases. Without a clear standard, courts will continue to reach incon-
sistent and unfair results. For example, a court might conclude that a
certain act by a government official constitutes affirmative misconduct
justifying an estoppel in a case where the plaintiff seeks nonmonetary
relief; yet in a subsequent case involving the same conduct, but where
plaintiff seeks monetary recovery, a court might refuse to apply equita-
ble estoppel. This anomalous result could also occur where a misrepre-
sentation was in writing in one case, but was made orally in another.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based upon "justice and good con-
science"; 96 the government's interests in adhering to statutory require-
ments and protecting the public fisc from fradulent claims do not
warrant a per se rule that precludes plaintiffs injured by the misconduct
of government officials from invoking this doctrine merely because of
the type of relief sought or the form of the misrepresentation.
B. The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Second Circuits Analsis
Although the Court's treatment of Hansen suffers from several de-
fects, some of the Court's criticisms of the Second Circuit's analysis are
well-founded. First, the Court was correct in rejecting the Second Cir-
cuit's reliance on the claims manual.97 As the Court recognized, the
manual is an internal procedural guide, not a legally binding regula-
tion.98 Judicial recognition of the manual's housekeeping rules as objec-
tive standards of official conduct would discourage agencies from
creating such guidelines. 99
claims, could not get the necessary information from the government. 366 F.2d at 965-66.
This claim of estoppel, however, does not significantly differ from the claim in Hansen of
estoppel for misinformation. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 793 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing)("I trust that the majority does not intend to suggest that a claim of estoppel is more
likely to prevail when raised by a bank rather than by a person eligible for social security
benefits, but I do not believe that. . . the Government['s] fail[ure] to provide the information
necessary to file correct applications .. is substantively different from the Government's
failure in this case to supply [Mrs. Hansen] with correct information. . .
96 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 802, at 180.
The claim of the government to an immunity from estoppel is in fact a
claim to exemption from the requirements of morals and justice. As such, it
needs to be jealously scrutinized at every step. Confidence in the fairness of
the government cements our social institutions. No pinch-penny enrichment
of the government can compensate for an impairment of that confidence, for
the affront to morals and justice involved is the repudiation of a governmental
representation.
Berger, supra note 11, at 707.
97 Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 789-90.
98 Id.
99 Clearly it is in the public interest for an agency with over 80,000 employees,
making more than 1,250,000 disability determinations alone a year, with
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Second, the Court perceived correctly that the Second Circuit's
"distinction between [Mrs. Hansen's] 'substantive eligib[ility]' and her
failure to satisfy a 'procedural requirement' does not justify estopping
[the government] in this case." 10 0 As the Court observed, the written
application provision is one of the eligibility requirements for benefits
under the Social Security Act. Unless a claimant has "filed application
for. . . benefits," she is ineligible under the statute. 10 1 Finally, the Sec-
ond Circuit's procedural/substantive distinction is an unworkable stan-
dard; laws do not always fit comfortably into one category. 0 2 More
importantly, the procedural/substantive distinction, like the Supreme
Court's oral/written and monetary/nonmonetary distinctions, is irrele-
vant to the central question-whether the agent's misconduct sufficed to
justify estoppel. If the conduct does justify estopping the government,
then a plaintiffs redress should not depend upon whether the govern-
ment is being estopped from enforcing a "procedural" or "substantive"
requirement. 
0 3
215,300 reconsiderations.. . to issue housekeeping instructions to its employ-
ees in the interest of uniform, fair and efficient administration. But it is per-
plexing why an agency that issues such instructions should be held to a higher
legal standard of dealing with its clients than one that does not.
Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d at 956 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, judicial reliance on internal administrative procedural manuals would pro-
duce anomalous results. A court might conclude that an act constitutes misconduct because
the official involved did not comply with his manual; in a subsequent case presenting similar
facts and conduct, but involving an agency that has no such manual or guideline, the court
would be compelled to conclude that the same act does not constitute official misconduct.
100 Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 790.
Three explanations could explain why the Second Circuit distinguished procedural and
substantive statutory requirements. First, the court might have been attempting to circum-
vent its earlier decision in Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976), which
appeared to limit affirmative misconduct to noncompliance with a rule having the force of
law. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra. No such violation was present in Hansen, and
the court may have believed that it could justify a less restrictive standard of affirmative
misconduct in misinformation cases by limiting the application of estoppel to "procedural"
requirements.
Second, the Second Circuit may have created the distinction to limit the applicability of
its holding to cases involving misinformation by government agents. See Hansen v. Harris,
619 F.2d at 949. Aware of the government's difficulty in rebutting a charge of oral misinfor-
mation, the court may have been trying to prevent persons ineligible for benefits from ob-
taining them through fraudulent or frivolous allegations of official misconduct.
Third, the court may have been striving to protect the public treasury by limiting the
application of estoppel to cases in which the claimant is "substantively" a member of the class
to which Congress has awarded benefits. Id. at 948.
101 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1)(D)(1976); see Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 790. The Sec-
ond Circuit's assertion that "[i]t would fulfill the fundamental legislative goal to grant [Mrs.
Hansen] the benefits she seeks," 619 F.2d at 948, finds no support in the statute. See note 55
supra. Moreover, the court cited no legislative history to support its assertion.
102 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)(discussing substance and pro-
cedure in regard to Ere doctrine); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949)(same); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)(same).
103 Comparing Hansen, an example of "procedural" ineligibility, to Goldberg v. Wein-
berger, 546 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), a case involving "sub-
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IV
A PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR ESTOPPEL
A standard for the proper application of equitable estoppel against
the government must ensure justice and fairness, the underlying pur-
poses of equitable estoppel, without impairing governmental functions
and policies.' 0 4 This Note proposes such a standard. The test clarifies
the misconduct requirement and suggests a uniform approach to the
application of equitable estoppel against the government.
A court presented with a claim requesting equitable estoppel
against the government first must decide whether the conduct in ques-
tion constitutes official misconduct.105 The court should determine
whether the conduct was inconsistent with the fundamental objectives
and functions of the particular agency.' 0 6 After these objectives and
functions are initially determined, future questions of official miscon-
duct can be resolved consistently. If the court finds official misconduct,
stantive" ineligibility, illustrates the potential unfairness of the Second Circuit's distinction.
In Goldberg, a Social Security agent informed the plaintiff incorrectly that remarriage before
the age of 60 would reduce but not terminate her widow's disability benefits. 541 F.2d at 480.
Relying on the misrepresentation, she remarried two months prior to her sixtieth birthday,
and consequently lost her benefits. Id. at 478-79. The Second Circuit held that the govern-
ment was not estopped from asserting the statutory age requirement in denying her benefits.
Id. at 481. Reliance on the misrepresentation in Goldberg terminated the plaintiff's benefits,
while reliance on the alleged misrepresentation in Hansen only caused Mrs. Hansen to lose one
year's benefits. See Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 949 (2d Cir. 1980). Under the Second
Circuit's analysis, Mrs. Hansen is entitled to retroactive benefits while the Goldberg plaintiff,
who suffered the greater harm, is entitled to no redress.
104 For a proposed statutory solution, see Newman, Should Oftial Advice Be Reliable?-
Proposals as to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 374
(1953). Professor Newman recognized the need to improve government agencies' accounta-
bility for prior representations. His proposal attempts to protect parties who relied in good
faith on government advice. The statutory proposal, however, is overly restrictive. It would
only estop the government from imposing damages or penalties upon a party whose "conduct
was in conformity with and in good faith reliance on a rule, order, opinion, or other written
statement of an agency responsible for administering that law. . . ." Id. at 389. The require-
ment of a writing is too narrow and would preclude estoppel in cases of oral misrepresenta-
tions. The courts can protect the government from fraudulent claims and defenses by
requiring sufficient extrinsic evidence to substantiate a claim of oral misrepresentation. See
notes 109-10 and accompanying text infia. Professor Newman did leave open the possibility
that courts could retain the power to estop the government in circumstances not covered by
the statutory proposal. Id. at 389 n.77.
105 The term "official misconduct" is preferable to "affirmative misconduct" because the
latter term generates too much confusion. See, e.g., Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). In Santiago the court distinguished nonfea-
sance and misfeasance and suggested that only misfeasance could constitute affirmative mis-
conduct. Id. at 493. The court described the officials' misconduct as failure to inform the
immigrants of the requirement, characterized the conduct as nonfeasance, and thus refused to
estop the government. Id. Had the court described the conduct as an improper admission of
the aliens, it could have found misfeasance and affirmative misconduct.
106 Courts should examine the enabling statute, legislative history, relevant regulations,
and any other evidence of the agency's functions and objectives.
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it should then look for the traditional elements of estoppel: 10 7 (1) the
official involved knew the facts; (2) he intended that his conduct would
be acted upon, or his conduct was such that the party asserting the es-
toppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the party asserting
the estoppel was unaware of the true facts; and (4) he detrimentally
relied on the official's conduct.°8 If official misconduct is accompanied
by these traditional elements, the court should estop the government.
This approach protects the interests of innocent parties by preventing
the government from repudiating its prior statements or actions, yet
does not hamper important governmental activities.
To supplement the foregoing standard, courts should allocate evi-
dentiary burdens in a manner that protects the government from frivo-
lous allegations of official misconduct. In misinformation cases, for
example, courts should require the party alleging the misconduct to sub-
stantiate the allegation of oral misrepresentation with extrinsic evidence.
In Hansen, written documentation such as the representative's daily
log, ' 0 9 testimony by the representative admitting his error, or testimony
by a disinterested third party"o would have satisfied this requirement.
Under the foregoing analysis, the propriety of applying equitable
estoppel in Hansen depends upon whether the agent was actually respon-
sible for misinforming Mrs. Hansen.' 11 If the misinformation was the
agent's own fault, the Second Circuit should have found official miscon-
duct. An important function of the Social Security Administration is to
107 See notes 1 & 47 supra. Many courts have modified the elements of equitable estoppel.
Some courts have used the term "quasi-estoppel" to indicate the absence of one or more
traditional elements of estoppel. Robbins v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 403, 407 (Ct. Cl.
1937) ("[Q]uasi estoppel. . .[is] the doctrine ... extended by the modem courts to prevent a
wrong being done 'wherever, in good conscience and honest dealing' a party ought not to be
permitted to repudiate his previous statements, declarations, or actions."); Note, 28 NOTRE
DAME LAW., supra note 14, at 236. See general.y Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of
Discretion as Applied Against the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAx L. REV. 487,
487-89 (1964).
108 See United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
917 (1979); note 1 supra.
109 In Hansen, the notes in the representative's log were insufficient to substantiate a claim
of misrepresentation. They indicated only that he believed that Mrs. Hansen's claims had
already been adversely determined. The notes contained no information regarding the sub-
stance of the interview. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d at 946; see note 54 supra.
150 Mrs. Hansen's mother testified that she had accompanied her daughter to the Social
Security office, but she was not present during the interview. 619 F.2d at 945.
111 See notes 65, 79, 81 and accompanying text supra. Justice Marshall, dissenting, ar-
gued persuasively that only the agent could have been responsible for the misinformation.
First, he noted that the amendment that the Court characterized as "recent" had been in
effect for a year and a half at the time of Mrs. Hansen's inquiry. 450 U.S. 785, 794 (1981).
Second, he found the majority's view that Mrs. Hansen may have failed to provide all the
relevant facts "wholly implausible" because the benefits in question are available only to
those with deceased spouses, and because the agent's questions indicated his mistaken belief
that Mrs. Hansen would be ineligible if she were divorced at the time of her former husband's
death. Id. at 794 n.3.
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advise the public of the eligibility requirements for Social Security bene-
fits;" 2 and misinformation provided by a representative would consti-
tute official misconduct because it impedes the fundamental advisory
functions of the agency. The facts of Hansen would have presented the
traditional elements of estoppel if the agent were responsible."13 On the
other hand, if the court found that the representative was not aware of
all of the facts, a necessary element of the doctrine would be absent," 14
and the court could not estop the government.
CONCLUSION
Courts have failed to develop a workable approach to requests for
equitable estoppel of the government. The Supreme Court's failure to
clarify the standard of "affirmative misconduct" and to examine thor-
oughly the facts in light of the traditional elements of estoppel has re-
stricted the invocation of estoppel against the government. Although
112 Similarly, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) acts in an advisory ca-
pacity. Aliens rely on the INS for information regarding immigration procedures and citizen-
ship requirements. Rather than estopping the government in citizenship status cases, courts
have found instead that the individuals have not voluntarily relinquished their citizenship.
E.g., Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1951)(because of official misinformation,
signing of military exemption did not constitute waiver of citizenship rights); Podea v. Ache-
son, 179 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1950)(foreign military service did not cause voluntary expatri-
ation because of State Department's erroneous advice). See aso Gordon, Fiality ofImmigralion
and Nationaliy Deteiminations-Can the Government be Estopped, 31 U. CHi. L. REv. 433, 456
(1964).
In contrast to the SSA and INS, a regulatory agency's misinformation would not consti-
tute official misconduct. For example, in an enforcement action, the Securities and Exchange
Commission would not be estopped from asserting that an issuer's registration statement con-
tained a misleading material fact because of an SEC agent's representation to the issuer that
his registration statement was satisfactory. Apart from § 23 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1976), which protects the SEC from unlawful representations, several
factors support this conclusion. First, the function of the SEC is to protect investors, not
issuers, seeking registration. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861 (2d Cir.
1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564, 567
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). Second, the issuer is in a far better position than the SEC to know the truth
of the information disclosed in the registration statement. See Doman Helicopters, Inc., 41
S.E.C. 431,441 (1963) ("The burden ofseeing to it that a registration statement filed with [the
SEC] neither includes any untrue statement of a material fact nor omits any material fact
. . . always rests on the registrant itself, and it never shifts to [the SEC]."). Third, the issuers
of public offerings are corporations or persons in control of a corportion. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(4) & (11) (1976). They therefore possess financial and
legal resources far greater than most individuals who deal with the INS and SSA. Cf.
Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1976)(noting that petitioner who had
not been informed properly by INS agent was "a naive and poorly educated alien").
The role of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) poses a more difficult case than that of
the SEC because it fulfills both regulatory and advisory functions. The IRS is responsible for
enforcing federal tax laws and collecting revenues. It also provides information and advice to
taxpayers. See note 41 supra. Some commentators have supported the view that the doctrine
should apply to the IRS. See Manning, supra note 41, at 383; Comment, supra note 11, at 398-
99.
113 See notes 65 & 81 supra.
114 See note 1 supra.
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the Supreme Court was justified in rejecting the Second Circuit's ap-
proach to equitable estoppel, its own cursory analysis in Hansen may
exacerbate the deficiencies prevalent in prior case law. Instead of per-
petuating the confusion that surrounds the affirmative misconduct re-
quirement, the Supreme Court should adopt a test that (1) examines the
government's misconduct as it relates to the objectives and functions of
the relevant agency, and (2) evaluates the evidence in terms of the tradi-
tional elements of equitable estoppel.
Deborah H Eisen
